Descriptive data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) suggest that men aged 65 to 69 years were about 6 percentage points less likely to be retired in 2004 than in 1992, and data from the CPS and the Health and Retirement Study suggest a corresponding difference of 3 percentage points between 1998 and 2004. Changes in Social Security rules that were phased in between 1992 and 2004 increase full-time work by those aged 65 to 67 by a bit less than 2 percentage points, raising full-time work by those aged 65 to 67 by about 9%. Altogether, the changes in Social Security benefits increase labor force participation by those aged 65 to 67 by between 1.4 and 2.2 percentage points, or 2% to 4%, depending on age. About one sixth of the increase in labor force participation between 1998 and 2004 for married men aged 65 to 67 is due to changes in Social Security.
retirement credit, phasing in these changes over decades. In 2000, the Senior Citizens' Freedom to Work Act abolished the Social Security earnings test for those between the full retirement age and age 70. Consistent with these rule changes, the labor force participation of men aged 65 to 67 years stopped declining, then stabilized, and more recently has increased, by about six percentage points between 1992 and 2004 and by three to four percentage points between 1998 and 2004.
The aim of this study is to determine the extent to which changes in Social Security were responsible for these changes in the retirement of older men. Changes in market factors and government policies induced by the aging of the baby boomers also have undoubtedly played a role. 1 To obtain an estimate of the effects of changes in Social Security rules on retirement, one must standardize for the influence of these other factors.
To isolate the effects of changes in Social Security rules, we use a dynamic, stochastic structural retirement model fit to data for married men from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) . This model provides us with an estimate of the preferences that influence the retirement decision. We then change the opportunity set to reflect the differences in the Social Security rules applicable to different cohorts, holding constant the other factors that shape retirement.
We use a newer version of our model of retirement and saving. This version is expanded not only to explain the fraction who partially retire and who work full-time but also to incorporate reversals in decisions. Some people first decrease their work effort by partially or fully retiring and then at some later time increase their work effort. Using this model, we find that changes in Social Security increased full-time work by those aged 65 to 67 years by about 9% between 1992 and 2004 and from 1998 to 2004 accounted for about one sixth of the observed increase in labor force participation of those aged 65 to 67.
In the next section, we discuss patterns of labor force participation of older workers and place the recent trend in the retirement of men over 65 years old into perspective. We then discuss the intuition underlying our modeling effort and the policy simulations described in this article. The following section provides a more technical summary of the key features of the structural model of retirement and saving and its estimation. We then present calculations regarding the likely effects of changes in Social Security on the retirement of older married men. We present our conclusions in the final section.
Patterns of Labor Force Participation of Older Men
Most of the 20th century was characterized by a decline in the labor force participation rates of older men (Costa 1998) . After 1985, the trend toward the earlier retirement of men ceased (Quinn 2002) . There has been disagreement over whether the leveling of the trend to earlier retirement is permanent or temporary (Costa 1999; Quinn 1999) . But there is no controversy in the literature over the observation that at the end of the 1980s, the trend toward the earlier retirement of men at least leveled (Social Security Administration 2003) . Now, a variety of researchers are suggesting that this trend not only may have stabilized but may have recently reversed.
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In contrast to the gyrations of the labor force participation of older men, in recent decades, the labor force participation of older women has increased. This finding goes hand in hand with the large increase in the labor force participation of women of all ages.
Among the changes in government policies induced by the aging of the baby boomers, the abolition of mandatory retirement and the adoption of other rules prohibiting age discrimination encourage delayed retirement. The employment and compensation policies of firms were also changed to encourage continued work. One important change is the trend in pensions from defined benefit plans, which often have exerted strong incentives for early retirement, to defined contribution plans, which are more neutral when it comes to encouraging retirement at a particular age. On the other side of the ledger, rising incomes encourage earlier retirement. Rapid advances in technology, the rise of international competition, and the decline of unionized, durable goods and other industries also exert pressures toward earlier retirement. The influence of changing labor market participation decisions of women also may influence their husbands' retirement decisions.
Our analysis of the relation of changes in Social Security to changing patterns of retirement is based on data from the HRS. Table 1 shows the various birth cohorts for which retirement data are available in the HRS. There are three groups of 50-to 56-year-olds. They include the younger half of the original HRS cohort, those born from 1936 to 1941 who were 50 to 56 in 1992. Also included are members of the war baby cohort, born from 1942 to 1947. They were 50 to 56 in 1998. Last, members of the early boomer cohort, born from 1948 to 1953, were 50 to 56 in 2004. There also are three groups of 56-to 62-year-olds. 3 One group, born from 1932 to 1937, was 56 to 62 in 1994. 4 Those born from 1936 to 1941 were 56 to 62 in 1998, and those born from 1942 to 1947 were 56 to 62 in 2004. Finally, there are two groups of 61-to 67-year-olds. They include those born from 1931 to 1936 (in 1998) and those born from 1937 to 1942 (in 2004). 5 Descriptive data for the HRS cohorts are presented in Table 2 . There, we define full-time work, partial retirement, and full retirement using hours per year of work. A person is said to work full-time if hours per year of work are 1,250 or higher, to be partially retired if hours per year of work range from 100 to 1,249, and to be fully retired if hours per year of work are 99 or lower. Comparable data by age group and cohort are presented in the two panels of Figure 1 . 
Employment Population Ratios for Males in the CPS Data
Consistent with the literature, those over 65 years old were retiring later in 2004 than in earlier years. Contrary to the suggestions in the current literature, according to the data in Table 2 , those aged 50 to 56 retired at younger ages in 2004 than in previous years. Figure 1 indicates that retirement trends are similar when measured either with the HRS or with the CPS. Most important from the perspective of the present study, for those over 65, there was an increase in the employment population ratio. According to HRS data, between 1998 and 2004, the fraction of 65-to 67-year-old men who were completely retired declined by 3.1 percentage points. According to CPS data, the comparable increase in the employment population ratio for 65-to 67-year-old men between 1998 and 2004 was about 4 percentage points, with a 6 percentage point increase between 1992 and 2004.
In contrast, for men in their early 50s, employment population ratios declined between 1992 and 2004, and for those in their late 50s, there was a decline between 1998 and 2004. Over this period, the percentage of 50-to 56-year-old men who were not retired (i.e., working 1,250 hours per year or more) declined from 77.1% to 75.5%. The percentage who were fully retired increased by 1.7 percentage points. This change is consistent with the long-run trend toward earlier retirement, but as suggested by Hurd and Rohwedder (2008) , it is also consistent with very early exit from the labor force, perhaps because of increased disability. Consider next the change between 1998 and 2004. The 75.5% of men 50 to 56 years old who worked 1,250 hours or more in 2004 represents a decline from the 80.4% who worked 1,250 hours or more in 1998. Almost 2 percentage points of the decline in the number working full-time was mirrored by a corresponding increase in the share of 50-to 56-year-old men working part-time (i.e., working 100 to 1,249 hours per year). But again, in contradiction to the idea that early retirement is becoming less common, the fraction of 51-to 56-year-old men fully retired (i.e., working less than 100 hours per year) increased from 16.2 percentage points in 1998 to 19.4% in 2004. With standard deviations of between 0.8 and 1.2 years, the retirement rates observed between 1998 and 2004 are significantly different from each other. Figure 2 shows comparable data for women aged 50 years and older. The trend toward increased labor force participation of women is found to be reflected in lower retirement rates, with the work effort of older women having increased consistently through all age groups. 
Employment Population Ratios for Females in CPS Data

Intuition Underlying the Modeling Effort and Policy Simulation
Before turning to a technical description of the model, it is useful to discuss the intuition underlying the approach to modeling taken in this study. Following an econometric literature that has developed over the past two decades, we attempt in the model to represent key aspects of behavior on the assumption that retirees are well informed and are maximizing the combined value of the goods they consume over their lifetimes and the leisure they enjoy. There are three major parts of the model. First, there are the elements of the dependent variable observed in each period. The dependent variable itself is quite complex, as it includes employment or retirement status in each wave of the survey (i.e., full-time work, part-time work, or not at work when fully retired). Because these outcomes are recorded each period, and the panel data cover a number of periods, the labor market dependent variable includes flows among these three states from period to period, including reversals from states of lesser work to states of greater work. The dependent variable also includes the level of wealth accumulated in each period.
The second major part of the model is the opportunity set. Among the "prices" included in the opportunity set are the wages that can be earned by working full-time, a typically lower wage for part-time work, the increase in the value of a person's pension and Social Security benefits from additional work, any wages earned by a spouse, wealth accumulated to date and the returns to that wealth, and other sources of wealth accrued in the current period. Total income is determined by multiplying those prices by relevant quantities. For example, if a person is working full-time this period, and thus not part-time, the full-time wage is multiplied by one, and the parttime wage is multiplied by zero.
A third major part of the model is a mathematical representation of a person's preferences for consumption and leisure time in the present and in the future. An individual is assumed to place a positive value on consumption and on time spent at leisure, where the value placed on leisure depends on each individual's age and health. People are also assumed to value consuming in the present differently from consuming in the future (summarized by their time preferences). In addition, older age and poorer health make work more difficult and thus encourage earlier retirement. These preferences are assumed to differ among individuals. In particular, there are three sources of differences in taste among different individuals. They are (1) the time preference rate, the rate at which an individual would trade off present for future goods if the quantity of each were equal; (2) the value placed on overall leisure preferences so that the values of leisure and the consumption of goods can be compared; and (3) the relative attractiveness of part-time versus full-time work.
The task facing an individual is to determine how much to work and how much to consume in each period, which in turn determines how much the individual earns and saves in each period. This choice is based on the outcomes that will be determined not only in the current period but also in future periods. So, a person is assumed to be forward looking. For example, consider a person who held the same job for a number of years and is now deciding whether to leave the labor market today and come back in a year. In making that decision, the person is assumed to take into account the difference in wage between the present long-term job and the earnings from the next job that would be secured upon returning to the labor market and to consider the loss not only next year but for all years into the future.
The modern structural model of retirement also includes the following other features. First, saving and retirement are jointly explained. Second, the analysis is dynamic, explaining retirement outcomes from full-time to part-time work and or retirement and following saving over the life cycle. Third, reversals may occur when people move from states of lesser to greater work. Thus, some people return to the labor force after retiring fully or increase their hours of work after partially retiring. These reversals can be modeled because the analysis is stochastic. Some outcomes will surprise people, and some of the surprises, including those pertaining to employment opportunities, will be adverse. People may reduce their work effort over time, then subsequently increase it as health status or other circumstances change, some events foreseen and others not, or as they realize they have made errors. Fourth, although people are forward looking in their decision making, they may have different preferences for future over present goods. This means that the response rates to future rewards from wages or from postponing Social Security or pension claiming differ among the population. Last, many jobs typically held in the prime working years and paying higher wages require full-time work or none at all.
The data requirements for estimating the model are very demanding. Fortunately, the data set used in this analysis, the HRS, was designed to provide all of the information required to estimate a structural retirement model.
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The estimation process requires an investigator to select a mathematical form for a person's preferences that is not too restrictive, that is, does not determine the results but is flexible enough to reflect underlying relationships in the data, including differences among individuals. 7 The estimation then involves a search for parameters of the preference function that best explain the labor market and wealth outcomes observed in the data for each individual, given the labor market opportunities observed for that person. These parameters are chosen to explain certain moments of the data. These moments are the difference between some observed characteristic of the sample and the expected value of that characteristic implied by the model. One example is the percentage of the sample that is retired during one of the surveys. If the model is approximately valid, the observed value of the characteristic should be close to the expected value implied by the model, and the difference should be fairly small.
For the present model, the moments include full retirement at all ages between ages 54 and 66. For ages 55, 58, 60, 62, and 65, the moments also include full or partial retirement, full retirement if the observation was in the upper third of lifetime income, full retirement if the observation was in the lower third of lifetime income, full retirement if the individual was in poor health, and full or partial retirement if the individual was in poor health. The final set of moments measures the frequency with which individuals returned to full-time work in one survey, given that they were fully or partially retired in the previous survey.
Once the model is estimated, the preferences are representative of the U.S. population. We have written a number of papers addressing the implications of the estimates of the model, using a number of criteria to judge the performance of the model. First, there is the question of how well the model fits the data over which it was estimated. This requires much more than explaining the value of a single dependent variable. Rather, the labor market flows in the model are very complex. The task is to explain the flows among the states of retirement, partial retirement, and full-time work, including reversals from states of lesser work to states of greater work. For example, it is well known that most models of retirement cannot explain the most obvious dimension of retirement flows. A disproportionate number of people retire at age 62, even though on average, Social Security benefits provide no special incentive to retire at 62. If one waits a year until 63, yearly benefits are raised by enough in the future to cover the benefits lost by postponing benefit receipt for another year, plus an additional sum equal to a market interest rate is paid to compensate for having waited to secure the money. Thus, an in-sample test of the model is whether it explains the spike in retirements at 62. Most models cannot explain the spike in retirement at 62, but the model in the present study does.
An out-of-sample test is whether the model can explain the shift in the major spike in retirements between the 1970s and the 1990s from a peak at age 65 to a peak at age 62. When the pension, Social Security, and other rules in place in the 1970s were used instead of the rules in place in the 1990s, the estimates generated by a version of this model reproduced this finding (Gustman and Steinmeier 2005) .
Next, there are wide differences among individuals in the timing of their retirements, often associated with wide differences in different pensions, health circumstances, and other factors typically measured in retirement models. For example, those with defined benefit pension plans are very likely to retire once they become eligible for early retirement benefits, and they are highly unlikely to retire before. They do retire disproportionately at the time of eligibility for early pension benefits (Anderson et al. 1999) . Because their employers do not allow them to gradually reduce their hours of work as they phase into retirement (minimum hours constraints), most people retire directly from full-time work. They do not partially retire at all. The model reproduces that characteristic.
Different parameters of the model are linked directly to other dimensions of the observed patterns of retirement. The model matches the average age of retirement, the range of retirement ages, the sensitivity of retirement to economic incentives, the probability of returning to work after retirement, the percentage of individuals who partially retire, how the incidence of partial retirement changes with age, how retirement varies with general lifetime income, and the degree to which bad health encourages retirement, over and above its impact through earnings.
Once the preferences underlying the retirement and saving decisions of the population are estimated, public policies and the incentives they create can be used to perform additional tests of the model. We know how different features of pension and Social Security benefit structures affect the rewards to work and how a rational agent would respond to these incentives. The question in the context of the model is whether it predicts an appropriate response and whether that response is in fact observed after a policy change is introduced. For the period of the 1970s through mid-1980s, this approach suggests only a modest role for Social Security and pensions in shaping retirement trends. For example, as noted previously, Anderson et al. (1999) found that changes in pensions and Social Security in the 1970s and 1980s did encourage earlier retirement but that these changes explain only about a quarter of the trend toward earlier retirement over this period. Consistent with findings of Anderson et al., Friedberg and Webb (2003) projected that changes toward defined contribution plans will lead to postponed retirement.
The model can also be used to simulate the effects of changes in policies that have not yet been introduced but are under consideration. Taking the preferences estimated in view of past behavior, a researcher changes the representation of retirement programs to reflect the new or contemplated policies (e.g., the changes in pension and Social Security rules). The parameters already estimated for those who have recently retired, together with the budget sets for the new programs, yield an estimate of how behavior would change under the different sets of rules. Policies that are very different from present policies can be simulated. A major advantage of this approach is that features that will affect behavior in unexpected ways can be identified and modified if required. For example, this approach suggests that should personal Social Security accounts be adopted, it would matter whether covered workers were allowed to take their benefits as lump sums rather than as annuities. Gustman and Steinmeier (2008) found that allowing benefits from personal accounts to be taken as a lump sum would encourage earlier retirement.
After estimating the model, our approach in the present study is to vary the Social Security rules phased in from 1992 to 2004. This allows us to hold constant the effects of other changes realized over the period, including the very sharp changes in pensions. 
Methodology for Simulating the Effects of Social Security Changes With a Structural Model of Retirement and Saving
With the dynamic, stochastic model of retirement and saving, we hold constant the preferences of potential retirees and other components of their opportunity set, while allowing Social Security rules to change. 9 The effects of Social Security rule changes are simulated by using the Social Security rules applicable to the original HRS cohort, and then again simulating retirement using the Social Security rules that apply to those born 6 and 12 years later. The retirement changes simulated by the model are then matched against those observed in the descriptive data.
Our approach standardizes not only for the effects of changes in demand for members of different cohorts over time but also for unique events, such as the stock market boom, which affected members of different cohorts at different stages of their life cycles.
Empirical Estimates of the Retirement Model
As in a standard life cycle model, individuals maximize expected utility subject to an asset evolution constraint. Consumption and leisure over the lifetime are the choice variables in the model. The stochastic variables include the returns to assets, mortality outcomes, and retirement preferences. Potential wages and health are treated as exogenous and nonstochastic. Preferences for retirement may change once a person has retired, creating a mechanism that accounts for reversals from states of greater to lesser work.
In the model, for each year i, an individual chooses consumption C and leisure L to maximize expected utility:
L takes on a value of 1 if the individual is retired, 0 if he or she is working, and 0.5 if the individual is partially retired; h t indicates the strength of the individual's preference for retirement, which may vary from one person to the next; and ρ is the time preference rate, which also may vary from one person to the next.
The model is estimated for married men. The income of the spouse is assumed to be exogenous and nonstochastic. The index m takes on three values indicating whether both members of the couple survive until year t, only the husband survives, or only the spouse survives; s m,t is the probability that the household will have the composition described by m in year t; and T corresponds to the maximum age beyond which the household's survival probabilities are too small to matter.
The asset constraint is given by
A t is the level of assets in year t, and r t is the stochastic return on those assets in year t. Assets are assumed to start out at zero at the beginning of the working life and are not permitted to be negative. W t is the wage rate at time t, which will depend on whether the individual has stayed on his or her career job, which we also label as his or her main job, or has previously retired and is going back to work. The career (main) job is considered to be the job the individual holds until he fully or partially retires for the first time. The term E m,t is the income accruing to the spouse, including earnings and pensions. The spouse is assumed to have a retirement date unaffected Gustman, Steinmeier / Changes in Social Security 273
by the individual's choices, and the term is taken to be zero in states in which the spouse is no longer alive. B m,t is the amount of the individual's pension and the household's Social Security benefits, both of which will be affected by the individual's retirement decisions. For defined benefit pensions, the benefit amount is determined by the retirement date and continues until death. For defined contribution pensions, the contributions are put into an account and allowed to accrue subject to the same stochastic return as is applied to assets. The account is assumed to be made available to the individual when the individual retires from the career job. Household Social Security benefits are calculated according to the Social Security rules, depending on previous retirement decisions and the composition of the surviving household. Because most individuals claim benefits as soon as eligible (Coile et al. 2002; Gustman and Steinmeier 2002) , we do not try to model the acceptance decision here and instead assume that the individuals will claim the benefits as soon as they can, consistent with the earnings test.
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Individuals are assumed to be heterogeneous with regard to both their time preference rate and their retirement preferences. With regard to time preference, we assume that ρ has a different value for different individuals and essentially treat it as a fixed effect in the estimation.
11 Retirement preferences are reflected in the coefficient to the leisure term in the utility function and are characterized by h t = e βX t + ε t .
The linear form βX t has three terms: a constant, age, and health status. The coefficient of age is taken to be positive, so that retirement gradually becomes more desirable as an individual ages and finds work to be more difficult.
The ε t term in h t reflects relative preference for leisure. An individual starts out with a value of ε drawn from a distribution with mean zero and standard deviation σ ε and keeps this value until he retires from the career job. Upon retirement, the individual may find that retirement is more or less fulfilling than anticipated, or perhaps the individual may find that he values consumption relatively more than he had thought. In any case, experience allows the value of ε to change after retirement, and the model reflects this by allowing the value of ε t to vary after retirement, with values in successive years correlated with a correlation parameter, ρ ε . If the individual finds that retirement is substantially less fulfilling than anticipated, a return to work, albeit at a reduced wage compared with the career job, may be the optimal decision.
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γ is proportional to the utility value of leisure. It has a value of 0 if an individual is working full-time (L = 0), a value of 1 if the individual is fully retired (L = 1), and a value of 0.5 if the individual is partially retired (L = 0.5). L γ = (0.5) γ should take on a value between 0.5 and 1 if diminishing marginal utility of leisure is to be satisfied. Call this value V p . If V p is close to unity, full-time work is particularly onerous compared with partial retirement work, and most people should go through a period of partial retirement. If, on the other hand, V p is close to 0.5, the marginal disutility of work is rising very slowly with additional work. As with time preferences and ε, we assume that individuals are heterogeneous with regard to their valuation of partial retirement leisure. For any individual, V p comes from a random draw from the truncated exponential distribution f(V p ) = ke δVp , defined on the interval 0.5 to 1. For a given values of δ, k is the value needed to make the distribution function integrate to unity over the interval. If δ is positive, values of V p toward unity will be more common, whereas if δ is negative, values near 0.5 will be more common. The value of δ is a function of age: δ = δ 0 + δ a Age. The value of V p is set to 0.5 for individuals with health problems.
An individual carries several state variables from one period to the next; these are variables that are consequences of past decisions and random events that have a bearing on the current decision. Five state variables are applicable in all periods. These are the level of assets, A t ; the time preference rate, ρ; the level of overall leisure preferences, ε t ; the relative utility of part-time leisure, V p ; and whether the individual is still in the career job. If the individual is still in the career job and that job has a defined contribution pension, there is another state variable relating to the size of the defined contribution balance. After the individual has left the career job, additional state variables related to the value of defined benefit pension amounts and Social Security benefits are introduced. Before retirement from the career job, the defined benefit and Social Security amounts are completely determined from the fact that the individual is still in the career job, and thus these amounts do not have to be included as separate state variables.
The Data
The model was estimated for members of the original HRS cohort covering outcomes through 2002. It uses matched Social Security records when available and requires matched records for respondents with pensions. There is a slightly different definition of retirement from that used in the descriptive data, where the detailed information used to define retirement with HRS data was not available for the CPS data. Individuals working at least 30 hours per week and 1,560 hours per year are counted as working full-time. Individuals working at least 100 hours per year but no more than 25 hours per week or 1,250 hours per year are counted as working parttime, and individuals not doing any work at all are counted as fully retired. Individuals who fall between full-time and part-time or between part-time and retired are classified on the basis of self-reports. Wealth is measured in the 1992 survey.
The final sample consists of 2,231 respondents for whom we can construct, at least approximately, the details of their earnings and income opportunities, and for whom the model seems appropriate. This is slightly less than half of the number of married men available in the original HRS sample.
Estimation of the Model
The parameters are estimated using the generalized method of moments. They include the consumption parameter, α; the standard deviation, σ ε , for the retirement preference variable, ε; the correlation, ρ ε , of the values of ε once the individual leaves the main job; the two coefficients, δ 0 and δ a , that describe the distribution of V p ; and the coefficients in the linear term, βX t , which affects retirement preferences. These coefficients include β 0 , the constants; β a , the coefficient of age; and β h , the coefficient of health.
The coefficients estimated by the simulated generalized method of moments procedure are reported in Table 3 . The estimated coefficients are all significantly different from zero by conventional standards. Of particular importance, the coefficient of the age variable implies that retirement leisure is increasing in value by 5.4% per year. This relatively low value means that economic incentives should be able to have considerable influence on retirement. The autocorrelation coefficient for the leisure preference term is significantly less than unity, which means that individuals can experience changes in their perceptions of retirement after they begin to experience it. If they find retirement less attractive than anticipated, they may well reverse course and go back to work for a while, at least until the inexorable march of age finally makes retirement appealing again. Poor health increases the value of retirement leisure by approximately the same amount as being over seven years older.
The overall fit of the model is measured by the q statistic. In the present context, there are 43 moments and eight parameters, so there are 35 degrees of freedom. 12 The statistic of 41.56 is well within the bounds of a χ 2 statistic with 35 degrees of freedom, which has a 5% critical value of 49.80. This means that, at least among the moments considered in the estimation, there is no evidence that the model does not fit the data well.
Time preference rates are heterogeneous. Half the population exhibit time preference rates below 5% and may be expected to respond relatively strongly to delayed incentives. On the other hand, over a third exhibit time preference rates of 20% or greater and may be expected essentially to respond only to incentives that affect current consumption. Table 4 reports observed retirement outcomes for the original HRS cohort, and simulated retirement outcomes under the current program, with each included individual having the work history actually experienced and reflected in own Social Security earnings record and reported job history. The spike in retirements from full-time work at age 62 is approximately the right height, although the spike at age 65 is a couple of percentage points too low. Comparing the flow into full retirement, the spike at 62 is a couple of points low, but the spike at 65 is approximately the right height.
The simulations also do a fairly good job of matching reverse flows.
14 For example, 3.3% of the respondents who were aged 54 to 66 years in Table 4 Observed and Projected Retirement Percentages Gustman, Steinmeier / Changes in Social Security 279 1994 and 1996 were observed to be working full-time in 1996 and either fully or partially retired in 1994. In the simulations, 3.2% of the respondents who were aged 54 to 66 in 1994 and 1996 were simulated to be working full-time in 1996 and fully or partially retired in 1994.
Estimates of the Effects of Changes in Social Security on Recent Trends in Labor Force Participation
The effects on retirement of evolving Social Security policies are simulated by altering the budget constraint described above. We begin with the assumption that each person in the HRS is covered by whatever set of Social Security rules has governed the benefits the person is actually scheduled to receive. We then ask what happens to retirement outcomes when these rules are changed. In particular, we consider the effects of changing the normal retirement age, the earnings test and the delayed retirement credit. (We do not consider the effects of changing the covered earnings limits.)
Our approach is to present the numbers falling in different retirement states by age in Table 5 and the corresponding flows among retirement states in Table 6 . Under each outcome, we present the simulated numbers first for the actual rules that governed the behavior of the person during his or her lifetime, then in the following column advancing the Social Security rules as if the person came from a cohort 6 years younger, and in a final comparison advancing the rules by another six years, applying the Social Security rules that would apply to a cohort 12 years younger. We leave all other aspects of earnings, pensions, and health constant.
To facilitate an understanding of how the changing Social Security rules affect retirement outcomes, Tables 7 and 8 present the differences in the outcomes, using outcomes under Social Security rules for those 6 years younger compared with the baseline outcome (0 years younger), then comparing outcomes using Social Security rules for those 12 years younger than the HRS cohort compared with outcomes under Social Security rules for those 6 years younger, and finally comparing outcomes under Social Security rules for those 12 years younger compared with the outcomes under the baseline Social Security rules.
Baseline Results
First consider baseline results where retirement outcomes are predicted using the actual rules that will apply to each of the relevant individuals in the HRS. Columns 1, 4, 7, and 10 of Table 5 show retirement outcomes under actual rules that applied to the HRS cohort, that is, the cohort born from 1931 to 1941, which include the normal retirement age and delayed retirement credit dependent on year of birth and the earnings test as the respondent experienced it. By age 60, from columns 1 and 4, 60.3% (50.4% + 9.9%) are still working full-time, with 50.4% still in their long-term jobs, and another 9.9% of the population working in full-time jobs after having retired. Still another 9.9% are partially retired, leaving 29.8% completely retired. By age 62, the fraction working on the main job has declined to about one third, with another 7.4% working full-time after retiring, and 15.3% partially retired, so that 56.1% (33.4% + 7.4% +15.3%) of the population are engaged in some type of work, with 60% of them still in their main jobs. By age 65, only 15.9% are working in their main jobs, with 7.4% 280 Research on Aging Note: Baseline is rules that applied to Health and Retirement Study respondents over their lifetimes. Table 6 Selected Table 6 show the 5 highlighted flows among various retirement states under the rules that were in place during the work lives of the respondents. Column 1 reports the net flow out of full-time work (flow out minus flow in). At age 62, when the respondents are first eligible to receive Social Security benefits, 14.6% of the population leaves full-time work. The net flow into full retirement, as shown in column 4, is 10.2%. As seen in column 7, the percentage newly returning to full-time work increases slightly with age, with the flow ranging between 2.0% and 4.1% of the population. In most years, the percentage flowing into part-time work is of the same order of magnitude and is shown in column 10. However, there is a spike in the flow into part-time work at age 62, with 8.7% of the population entering part-time work. As can be seen by comparing columns 1, 10, and 13, until age 65, most of those entering part-time work come from full employment. After age 65, more than half of those entering part-time work come from full retirement.
It is also of interest to compare the flows in Table 6 with the corresponding stocks in Table 5 . From age 62 on, the fraction partially retired in Table  5 is roughly 15% to 17%. After age 62, the flow into partial retirement from Table 6 is about four percentage points each year. This suggests an average duration of partial retirement of about four years.
Changes in Retirement Outcomes With Changing Social Security Rules
Remembering that the underlying levels of outcomes and flows are available in Tables 5 and 6 , we turn now to the differences in retirement outcomes and retirement flows that result from differences in Social Security rules affecting each cohort. These differences in retirement outcomes are shown in Tables 7 and 8. Starting at age 62, there is a small effect of Social Security rule changes on retirement outcomes. From Table 7 , columns 3 and 6, accelerating the rules by 12 years would reduce the number working full-time at age 62 by 2.0 percentage points, with 1.3 percentage points coming from the main job and 0.7 percentage points coming from those working full-time after they had previously retired. With 40.8% of the 62-year-old population working fulltime under baseline conditions, the reduction in full-time work due to Social Security rule changes amounts to 5% of the 62-year-old workers at full-time employment under the baseline rules. In Table 8 , there is a corresponding difference in the flow of those retiring from full-time work at age 62.
In contrast, for 65-year-old workers, we see from Table 7 that the fraction at full-time work increases by 2.0 (1.4 + 0.6) percentage points as a result of changes in the rules over 12 years, with 1.4 percentage points coming from an increase in work in the main job, and another 0.6 percentage points coming from an increase in the percentage in full-time work after retiring. At age 66, rule changes foster an increase of 2.0 (1.0 + 1.0) percentage points, which with 20.8% of those aged 66 years at full-time work at baseline (13.0% + 7.8%) amounts to an increase of 10% in 66-year-olds at full-time work. At 65, there is a 0.3 percentage point increase in part-time work due to Social Security rule changes. There are smaller, but analogous increases in full-time work for those aged 67 to 69. Turning to Table 8 , from age 63 to 66, under the Social Security rules applying to younger compared with older cohorts, the net percentage retiring from full-time work is lower by 0 to 2 points. From ages 67 to 69, the percentage retiring from full-time work is increased by the new rules.
Overall, Table 2 revealed an increase of 3 (27.5 -24.5) percentage points in the fraction of the 65-to 67-year-old population at full-time work between 1998 and 2004, an increase of 0.1 percentage points at part-time work, and a corresponding decline of 3.1 percentage points in the fraction of the population fully retired. Averaging the effect of the differences for those aged 65 to 67 years in Table 5 between columns 3 and 2, and columns 6 and 5, over 0.5 percentage points, or about 18% of the total increase observed in Table 2 , is due to changes in incentives from Social Security.
Another finding from the top half of each table (i.e., through age 61) is that differences in the Social Security rules that apply to different cohorts have almost no effect on retirement outcomes or flows until age 62, the age of earliest eligibility for Social Security benefits, is achieved. Although the forward-looking agents simulated in this model will shape their behavior at younger ages in light of Social Security rules that will affect their benefits in later years, there appears to be no differences in incentives resulting from differences in the rules among cohorts. Thus, the decline in labor force 286 Research on Aging participation observed for those in their 50s in the underlying data is not the result of changing Social Security rules.
Summary and Conclusions
We have examined how the differences in Social Security rules applying to those with different birthdates affect the retirement behavior of men over time. We document the changes in retirement status among cohorts in the HRS. For those aged 65 to 67 years, there is a clear trend toward later retirement.
Changes in Social Security rules that were phased in between 1992 and 2004 increase full-time work by those aged 65 to 67 years by a little under 2 percentage points, raising their full-time work by about 9%. Altogether, the changes in Social Security benefits increase labor force participation of those 65 to 67 by between 1.4 and 2.2 percentage points, or by 2% to 4%, depending on age. Social Security changes implemented between 1998 and 2004 account for about one sixth of the overall increase in labor force participation observed.
The changes in Social Security rules that increased the reward to postponing retirement have been in place for over two decades. This is sufficient time for the differences in retirement between HRS cohorts to represent long-run, rather than short-run, behavioral adjustments.
To isolate the effects of Social Security rule changes on retirement outcomes, it has been important to distinguish the different employment outcomes undertaken by older workers, working full-time at the main job, full-time at another job, or working when partially retired. We have used a dynamic, stochastic model of retirement and saving capable of analyzing full and partial retirement outcomes to simulate the effects of the changing Social Security rules. We would not have been able to distinguish full-time work after leaving the main job if the model were not designed to allow older persons to choose to increase their work effort after having reduced it. The model also included individual differences in time preference, so that it is capable of explaining why so many people retire at age 62, even though Social Security and pensions do not provide special financial incentives to retire at that age. A major advantage of using a structural econometric model is that it has allowed us to standardize for the influence of all other factors except the changing Social Security rules, and then to isolate the effects of the evolving Social Security rules.
1. Anderson, Gustman, and Steinmeier (1999) explored the effects on retirement of changing Social Security rules, pensions, and earnings between 1969 and 1989. Over that period, there was a sharp decline in the labor force participation of men in their 60s. We found that changes in pensions and Social Security accounted for about a quarter of the decline in labor force participation of men aged 60 and 62 years observed in the 1970s and 1980s, with the effects of pension and Social Security changes being of roughly equal importance. This earlier version of our model found that changes in Social Security and pensions did not account for the 24% decline in labor force participation of 65-year-old men over the period. The changes in Social Security and pensions alone were expected to generate a 7% increase in the participation of 65-year-old men over the two decades.
2. Much of the evidence for a reversal of the retirement trend is based on data on retirement expectations by those who are still in the labor force (Maestas 2006 ; Willis in ongoing work for the HRS).
3. Notice that when using birth years to define cohorts, given that the survey was conducted midyear, there is some overlap in reported age between cohorts.
4. For the 56-to 62-year-olds, there were no 62-year-old eligible participants in the original HRS cohort in 1992. It did not seem wise to shift the age range, so the first group of 56-to 62-year-olds relates to the 1932 to 1937 cohorts in 1994, not 1992. The underlying reason for this problem is that the original cohort contained only 11 birth years, so it could not be divided up into two 6-year groups corresponding to the later cohorts. As a result, as the HRS cohorts are moved through time, one must change either the birth cohorts or the age ranges.
5. For similar reasons to those noted in note 4, the group aged 61 to 67 years in 2004 was born from 1937 to 1942, not 1936 to 1941 . That is, to keep the same age range in 2004 as in 1998, we borrowed a birth year from the war baby cohort.
6. We are two of the four original co-principal investigators charged with designing the labor and pension sections of the HRS, and we did so with the needs imposed by the estimation of structural retirement models in mind.
7. The more rigid the approach to estimation, the more likely it is that a structural model will suffer from specification error. To be sure, there also are other potential problems with a structural approach. If a researcher believes that a totally different model will do a better job (e.g., that people are inconsistent in their behavior over time, as in models with hyperbolic discounting, or that imperfect knowledge must be included as a central feature of behavior), then the use of simple maximizing models will also introduce specification error. However, current models can be modified to include those and other elements of nonmaximizing behavior suggested by the psychology literature. To abandon the maximizing assumption, or modify it for subgroups of the population, one would need explicit evidence that those models do a better job in predicting retirement and saving behavior.
8. There are other approaches in the literature. One could take a difference in differences around one or another change in Social Security rules, whereby the change in retirement observed for those who are affected by a policy change is compared with the change in retirement observed for those in a control group who are not subject to the policy change. That approach requires that changes that are not the subject of the analysis affect the control group in exactly the same way they affect the experimental group. If there are other contemporaneous changes that have different effects on the control group and the experimental group, the omitted variables will create bias in estimates based on a difference-in-differences approach. Thus, one must be sure that other changes in Social Security, as well as changing patterns of participation by couples, pensions, and other factors occurring over the same period, all have identical effects on the experimental participants and the controls. Studies of the effects of abolishing the earnings test rely either on changes in the earnings test kink point (Friedberg 2000) or on the observed change in employment patterns between workers affected by the abolition of the earnings test and those who are not. Disney and Smith (2002) examined the effects of the abolition of the earnings test in Britain. Song (2002) , Song and Manchester (2006) , and Tran (2002) examined the effects of abolishing the earnings test for those over the normal retirement age in the United States.
9. The model we use was estimated in Gustman and Steinmeier (2006) . That paper presents a more detailed description of the model and our estimation strategy.
10. For a model that includes benefit claiming as an endogenous decision, see Gustman and Steinmeier (2008) .
11. In a different context, Ippolito (1997) made differential time preference rates a central focus. His analysis concerned the employer demand for labor and the structure of pensions.
12. These moments include percentages working full-time and working at all at various ages; the percentages working full-time with high income, with low income, and with poor health; the percentage working at all in poor health; and the percentage who increase their labor supply within two-year periods corresponding to the HRS survey dates.
13. The distribution of time preference rates is as follows:
Range 
